Journal of American Law

SPRING 2015

The Journal of American Law is a peer-reviewed journal and the only one of its kind in the country. The Journal is a law review focused on important legal issues ranging from complex litigation to Supreme Court rulings.

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Spring 2015 // Journal of American Law 33 that the debtor holds, becomes part of the bankruptcy estate. 37 Te bankruptcy estate includes "all legal or equitable inter- ests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." 38 Tis includes contractual rights. 39 When the bankrupt- cy court closes the case, assets that are disclosed automatically return to the debtor if the trustee has not administered those assets. Id. But assets that are not disclosed remain the proper- ty of the bankruptcy estate even afer the case is closed. "[U] nless it is administered or abandoned by the trustee, the [as- set] remains property of the state 'forever.'" 40 A debtor may seek to reopen the bankruptcy afer it is closed in order to amend her schedules. Amendment is liber- ally granted. As the court noted in In re Arana: Even when a bankruptcy case is reopened, the schedules are amended, the trustee is substituted as plaintif, the action is pursued and a recovery is ob- tained, there is no guarantee that a debtor will enjoy any beneft whatsoever. Te trustee brings the action on behalf of the estate, and proceeds must frst go to pay the trustee's expenses and the creditors' claims. … .And if surplus funds remain afer these expenses and claims are paid, then a debtor's entitlement to it may be subject to judicial estoppel or other equitable defenses. … Tis is because frst and last, a debtor who has crossed the line from honest but unfortu- nate to dishonest and scheming should not be per- mitted to proft from intentional misconduct that ofends the integrity of the bankruptcy process. 41 Tus, even if a policyholder who makes a claim for prop- erty that was not listed on her schedules seeks to reopen the bankruptcy in order to amend the schedules, she may not be entitled to recover on her insurance claim. Te trustee, if she elects to pursue the claim, would not be barred by judicial es- toppel because it was the debtor, not the trustee, who made inconsistent statements to the court. To the extent that cred- itors would beneft, recovery may be allowed. But the court will perform the analysis discussed above before determining whether judicial estoppel will bar a debtor from recovering any amounts in excess of the creditors' claims. 42 37 In re Arana, 456 B.R. 161, 169 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). 38 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). 39 Chartschlaa v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 538 F.3d 116, 122 (2 nd Cir. 2008). 40 In re Arana, 456 B.R. at 170. 41 Id., at 171. 42 If the debtor could have made a claim of exemption for an asset had it been disclosed, this might impact whether the trustee or the debtor has a right to the asset or its proceeds. Although judicial estoppel should apply as to the debtor, regardless of whether an exemption could have been asserted, countervailing consid- erations, including liberal permission to amend schedules and application of exemptions, may afect the outcome. An analysis of this question is beyond the scope of this article. Conclusion Judicial estoppel applies not only in bankruptcy cases, but also in other cases where fnancial assets must be disclosed or a party submits an afdavit or declaration swearing to property identity or ownership. In these flings, information that is rele- vant to a later insurance claim may be disclosed. For example, in divorce cases, the parties are required to exchange sched- ules of assets for the purposes of equitably dividing property. 43 When people swear in court to the truth of facts or le- gal positions and the court takes action based on those rep- resentations, they are bound by those representations and are barred from taking inconsistent positions later. Tis may have a signifcant impact on property insurance claims. Simply put, if the policyholder swore an item did not exist or was worth a small amount, he is bound by that position and cannot collect on an insurance claim based on diferent claimed facts. What constitutes truth does not depend on the goal of the legal pro- ceeding. All parties, including insurance companies, are en- titled to rely on facts sworn in court to be true and to make claims payment decisions based on those facts. 43 E.g. California form FL-160, Property Declaration, and form FL-142, Schedule Of Assets And Debts.

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