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Spring 2015 // Journal of American Law 41 Besides direct employers, workers' compensation statutes frequently defne an additional class of persons as "statutory employers," "principal employers," "prime contractors," or the functional equivalent (hereinafer, "statutory employers"). Tis legislatively created class comprises those entities that do not employ the injured employee directly but have a contractual re- lationship with the worker's employer on the same or a higher tier. Te requirements to satisfy statutory employer status vary from state to state, and the inquiry can be rather fact depen- dent. 2 Statutory employers historically have been immune from or his legal representative in case death results from the injury, may, at his option, elect to claim compensation under this chapter or to maintain a legal action in court for damages on account of the injury or death). 2 For example, to be entitled to statutory employer status under the case law predating Oklahoma's 2011 adoption of the Admin- istrative Workers' Compensation Act, the employer had to show that the work of the independent contractor was necessary and integral to its business by meeting the following test: [Te independent contractor's] work would not be considered part of the hirer's business, unless the hirer customarily uses its own employees to perform the specifc type of work in contest. If the task performed by the independent contractor is beyond the skill, training, expertise, or capability of the hirer's employees, it must be regarded as beyond the scope of the hirer's regular maintenance activities. Tis analysis allows the court to consider the hirer's size and complexity in relation to the task to be performed in order to ascertain that entity's statutory employer status. Bradley v. Clark, 804 P.2d 425 (Okla. 1990); see also, Md. Labor and Employment Code Ann. §§ 9-508(a)(1)-(3): A principal contractor is liable to pay to a covered employee or the dependents of the covered employee any compensation that the principal contractor would have been liable to pay had the covered employee been employed directly by the principal contractor if: (1) the principal contractor undertakes to perform any work that is part of the business, occupation, or trade of the principal contractor; (2) the principal contractor contracts with a subcontractor for the execution by or under the sub- contractor of all or part of the work undertaken by the principal contractor; and (3) the covered employee is employed in the execu- tion of that work. Id.; see, Bright v. Cargill Inc., 837 P.2d 348 (Kan. 1992): (1) [I]s the work being performed by the indepen- dent contractor and the injured employee necessarily inherent in and an integral part of the principal's trade or business? (2) is the work being performed by the indepen- dent contractor and the injured employee such as would ordinarily have been done by the employees of the principal? If either of the foregoing questions is answered in injured workers' lawsuits outside of the workers' compensation system. However, immunity comes at a cost. In most statutory schemes, if the independent contractor fails to secure workers' compensation insurance, the statutory employer is liable for compensating the independent contractor's injured employee under the applicable workers' compensation act. 3 Workers' Compensation immunity for Design Professionals Over the past few decades, several states have adopted tort im- munity under their workers' compensation laws for design professionals working on construction sites through either expanded statutory employer immunity or special excep- tion. When expressed in terms of statutory employer status, the statutes expand the defnition to include design profes- sionals solely for the purpose of immunity. Tis means that the design professional enjoys the immunity aforded to a statutory employer without a statutory employer's coexistent obligation to provide workers' compensation benefts for an uninsured injured worker. Whether by statutory provision or judicial interpreta- tion, immunity does not extend to negligent design prepa- ration or to circumstances where the design professional assumes the contractual duty to control job site safety. Al- though the case law interpreting these statutes is sparse and not uniform, the implication for a design professional pro- viding construction phase services is signifcant. If a design professional successfully establishes the prerequisites set out in the statute, all tort claims asserted by an injured employee not specifcally excepted by the particular statute are barred. Under most states' formulation, design professionals working on a construction project do not meet the standard defnition of a statutory employer. Tey are not prime con- tractors and rarely have any contractual arrangement with the employer of the injured worker. However, depending on the wording of the design professional statutory exception, all that may be necessary to prove immunity is that the party is a licensed architect or engineer and was providing services during a construction project. In Oklahoma, this issue recently was tested in Marti- nez v. Tyson Foods Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155514 (E.D. Okla. 2013). Tis case involved a major remodeling project at Tyson's poultry processing plant in southeastern Oklaho- ma. One of the contractors performing structural steel con- struction employed Martinez, who sufered severe injuries in a fall. Martinez recovered workers' compensation benefts through his employer and sued Tyson asserting that it had maintained unsafe working conditions that directly caused the afrmative, the work being done is part of the prin- cipal's trade or business and the injured employee's sole remedy against the principal is under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Id. at 356 (internal quotations omitted). 3 See, e.g., Okla. Stat. tit. 85A, § 36(A) [Oklahoma]; T.C.A. §50-6-113(a)-(c) [Tennessee]; Alaska Stat. § 23.30.045(a).