Journal of American Law

SPRING 2015

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30 Journal of American Law // Spring 2015 …there is some dispute as to whether judicial es- toppel is a viable doctrine in this circuit. [Citations omitted.] Accordingly the doctrine has only been invoked in "extreme cases in which the inconsistent positions have been the product of fraud or other de- liberately misleading conduct." [Citation omitted.] 13 A court may not apply judicial estoppel when the party's prior position was based on inadvertence or mistake. 14 "Te debtor's failure to satisfy its statutory disclosure duty is 'inadvertent' only when, in general, the debt- or either lacks knowledge of the undisclosed claims or has no motive for their concealment." [Citation omitted.] 15 Other jurisdictions require more: a showing that the statement is knowing and deliberate perjury. 16 A court in Ne- vada held: Judicial estoppel should be applied only when "a party's inconsistent position [arises] from intention- al wrongdoing or an attempt to obtain an unfair ad- vantage." Judicial estoppel does not preclude changes in position that are not intended to sabotage the ju- dicial process. 17 Because judicial estoppel is designed to protect the judi- cial system, not the litigants, detrimental reliance by the party seeking to enforce judicial estoppel, unlike equitable estoppel, is not required. 18 Judicial estoppel Applies to Prevent Contradicting Bankruptcy Statements Under the bankruptcy code and rules, a bankruptcy debtor has an express, afrmative duty to disclose all assets. 19 Te duty to ensure that the schedules are accurate is continuing: 20 13 Id., at 696. 14 Helfand v. Gerson, 105 F.3d 530, 536 (9th Cir. 1997). See, also, EaglePicher Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57683 (D.Az. 2007), where the court held that the debtor's intent in fail- ing to disclose information was a factor in determining whether to apply judicial estoppel; and Superior Crewboats, Inc. v. Primary P&I; Underwriters, 374 F.3d 330, 334 (5 th Cir. 2004). 15 Superior Crewboats, 374 F.3d at 335. 16 Prince v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26889 (E.D. Tenn. 2002). 17 NOLM LLC v. County of Clark, 120 Nev. 736, 743 (2004). 18 Superior Crewboats, 374 F.3d at 334, In re Estate of Loveless, 64 S.W. 2d at 578. 19 Id., In re Coastal Plains, 179 F.3d at 207-208, 11 U.S.C. § 521(a) (1). 20 In re Searles, 317 B.R. 368, 378 (9 th Cir. 2004). 11 U.S.C. § 521 imposes a duty upon the debtor to fully disclose the nature of his assets, liabilities, and fnancial afairs. Without such disclosure, the basic system of marshaling of assets and the resulting dis- tribution of proceeds to creditors would be an im- possible task. 21 Tis duty does not end when the schedules are fled. It continues for the duration of the bankruptcy proceeding. 22 Schedules that must be fled as part of a bankruptcy re- quire disclosure of all assets. Debtors are required to swear under penalty of perjury that all of the information on the bankruptcy schedules is true and correct. Schedule B contains 35 questions. It specifcally asks for a list of types of property that ofen are the subject of insurance claims—for example, jewelry. Tere also is a catchall question that requires the debtor to list "other personal property of any kind not already listed. Itemize." Te schedule requires a de- scription and the location of the property as well as the cur- rent value of the debtor's interest in the property. To deal with debtors who transfer property before fling for bankruptcy, the Statement of Financial Afairs form re- quires a statement of all property transferred within the pre- vious two years. 23 It also requires the debtor to list all property that another person owns but the debtor holds or controls. 24 Tis is to obtain information that might indicate the debtor owns property that he is seeking to hide by giving it to friends or relatives. Tese questions, taken together, require disclo- sure of all property the debtor owns, recently owned, or holds without ownership. When the conditions to apply the judicial estoppel doc- trine are met, a policyholder is barred from collecting on an insurance claim for assets that were owned but not disclosed in the prior bankruptcy fling. Te basic principle with regard to whether a policyholder will be permitted to make a claim for the loss of property that was not disclosed in prior court submissions is that a person cannot lose what she swore she did not have. When a debtor swears in her Schedule B that she owns no jewelry and the court and creditors rely on that in- formation in a bankruptcy proceeding, she is forever deemed to not own that property. If, during the insurance claims in- vestigation, it is established that the jewelry that is the subject of the claim was acquired before the bankruptcy schedules were fled and not disclosed in those schedules, as a matter of law the policyholder is barred from recovering for that lost or damaged item. Under the law, it did not exist. Te same rule applies to causes of action, including a cause of action against an insurer for breach of contract and bad faith for failing to pay an insurance claim. 21 In re Louden, 106 B.R. 109 (E.D. Ky. 1989). 22 Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co , 270 F.3d at 785. 23 Statement of Financial Afairs, question 10. 24 Statement of Financial Afairs, question 14.

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